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Patterson: Patterson: Principles of Nurnberg

THE PRINCIPLES OF NURNBERG AS A DEFENSE
TO CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
CHARLS E. PATrmSON*
I.

INTRODUCTION

[T]he position of a soldier is. .. a difficult one. He may... be
liable to be shot by a court-martial if he disobeys an order, and...
hanged by a judge and jury if he obeys it.'
Thus, the following dilemma would be forced upon the individual:
either to obey the laws of his country and become an international
criminal, or to obey international law and so incur predictable
punishment under national law.2
The judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Niirnberg
ignited a controversy which still smolders over the meaning of the principles
applied by the Tribunal and their application in international and domestic
law. At the core of this continuing controversy is the theory of individual
responsibility for the commission of crimes against peace which was formulated in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal and applied in
its judgment.3 In several recent decisions in the courts of the United States
this same theory of individual criminal responsibility of a citizen of the
United States, arising from the alleged commission of an international
crime against peace by the federal government in Vietnam, has been raised
as a defense to crimes involving civil disobedience.4 In order to assess this
*Associate with the firm of Watson, Ess, Marshall &Engass, Kansas City, Missouri; A.B., Kansas University 1963; J.D., Michigan 1966.
1. A. Dicmy, LAw OF THE CoNSTTIoN 303 (1939).
2. A. VON KNIERIEx, THE NUREMBURG TRIALs 45 (1959).
3. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL CHARTER art. 6. For the text of the

Charter, see 59 Stat. 1546 (1945). A full text of the judgment of the Tribunal may
be found in XXII TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFOaR THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL

411-589 (1948).

4. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 406 F.2d 456, 460 (5th Cir.), cert.

denied, 395 U.S. 982 (1969); Swallow v. United States, 325 F.2d 97, 98 (10th Cir.
1963); United States v. Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. 336, 341 (D. Md. 1968), afrd, 417

F.2d 1009 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 909 (1970); United States v.
Mitchell, 246 F. Supp. 874, 897 (D. Conn. 1965), aff'd, 369 F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 972 (1967); People v. Bloom, Crim. No. 951 (Cir. Ct. Mich.,
Jan. 28, 1966). See also Farmer v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 327, 328 (M.D. Tenn.
1956), affd per curiam, 252 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1958).
The scope of this article and cases discussed is limited to civil crimes as opposed to military crimes, and, further, limited to the so-called crime of aggressive
war or crime against peace as opposed to traditional war crimes.
For a discussion of the Niirnberg defense based upon the commission of war
crimes in Vietnam, see D'Amato, War Crimes and Vietnam: The "Nuremburg Defense" and the Military Service Register, 57 CAL. L. REv. 1055 (1969). For a compilation of publications concerning the legality of the United States' role in Vietnam, see R. FALK, THE VIETNAm WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAw (1968).

(33)
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"Niirnberg defense" it is necessary to examine the nature and limits of
this crime against peace and the extent to which the individual may be
responsible for its commission by his government; the obstacles which may
arise in using it as a defense in domestic courts; and the conflict, inherent
in the defense, between the theory of individual international criminal
responsibility and the necessity for order in the national state.
II.

THE CriME AGAINST PEACE AS A RuLE OF CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW

In August of 1945 the four major Allied Powers met in London and
agreed to establish an International Military Tribunal for the trial of war
criminals. 5 Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military, Tribunal
describes as an international crime for which there shall be individual responsibility:
Crimes against peace: Namely: planning, preparation, initiation or
waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international
treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common
plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing ....

0.

This definition envisages two separate crimes against peace, aggressive war
and a war in violation of treaties and agreements. 7
Numerous precedents were cited by the Tribunal to. justify the conviction of individual German defendants for the commission of the crime
against peace of aggressive war.8 The value of these precedents is in some
5. The London Agreement was signed August 8, 1945, by the Soviet Union,
the Republic of France, the United Kingdom and the United States. Agreement
for the Establishment of an International Military Tribunal, 59 Stat. 1544 (1945),
E.A.S. No. 472. See L. SOHN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON UNrrn NATIONS LAw 858-

59 (1956).

6. CHARTER, .supranote 3, art. 6.
7. Garcia-Mora, Crimes Against Peace in InterndtionalLaw: From Nirnberg
to the Present, 53 Ky. L.J. '35, 36 (1964).'
8. The Tribunal listed six pacts and treaties which in its estimation established that aggressive war was an international crime. These were.: (1) the General
Treaty for the Renunciation of War, 46 Stat. 2343 (1928), T.S. No. 796 (the "Kellogg-Briand Pact"); (2) The League of Nations 1924 Protocol'for ie Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J., Spec. Supp. 23, at
498 (1923); (3) The Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1923, LEAGUE'OF NATIONS
OFF.J., Spec. Supp. 13, at 403 (1923); (4) The Hague Convention of 1907, 36 Stat.
2199, T.S. No. 536; (5) a September 24, 1927 resolution of the Assembly of the
Leage of Nations condemning wars of aggression, LEAGUE OF NATI6NS OFF. J.,
Spec. Supp. 54, at 155-56 (1927); and (6) a resolution by the sixth Pan American
Convention condemning aggressive war, 62 BULL. PAN AM. UNION 5 (1928). I TRAL
OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

BEFORE

THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

219-22 (1947). For more exhaustive lists of precedents for the cririinality of aggressive war, see C. FRI.D, THE LAW OF AGGRESSION AND CRIMES AGAINST PEACGE'(1946);
S. GLiEcK, THE NUREMBEr!G TRIAL AND AGGRESSIVE WXR 24-34 (1946); R.. WoEmZEL,
THE NUREMBERG TRIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1740 (1960); Gluec, Thb Nuremberg Trial and Aggreisive War, 59 HARv. L. REv. 396, 408-12" (1946); Comment,
The Legality of Nuremberg, 4 DuQuEsNE.L. REv. 146 (1965).
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doubt.9 particularly their value in demonstrating that. individuals could
be held liable- for a crime against peace under international law at that
time. 10 Regardless of whether the crime against peace was an established rule
of international-law in 1945, it most certainly became international law in
1947, in the sense of newly established treaty law." The important question
now is whether the crimes against peace as formulated at Niirnberg have
matured from treaty law which binds-only parties to the agreement, into a
rule of customary international law which is binding upon all nations.
A rule of customary international law may be shown to exist by evidence of acceptance and usage among nations which demonstrates assent to
its existence as a rule of conduct. 12 Perhaps the greatest difficulty with
custom as a source of international law is determining at what stage it
may be said to be authoritative. 13 This difficulty is especially apparent in
examining the- crime of aggressive war. - The assent necessary for the establishment of aggressive war as criminal
under international custom may be found from five sources. First, subsequent trials by military tribunals at Nfirnberg,' 4 Tokyo, 1 5 and numerous
9. To obtain a general idea of the complexity of this dispute and the varying
Opinions, coinpare S. GLUECK, THE NnU MBFRG" TRIL AND AGGRESSIVE WAR 24-34
(1946), and R. WoE=ZEL, supra note 8, at .17-40, with Garcia-Mora, supra note 7, at

37-38, and Schwarzenberger, The Judgment of Nuremberg, 21 TUL. L. Rv. 329,

344-51 (1946-47)..
10. ..ee M. G4=ACI-MoRA,
STATES

HOSTIL

Acts oF PRIVATE PERSONS AGAINST FOREIGN

38 '(1962); S. GLUECK, supra note 9, at 7; A.

VON KNiERIEM,

supra note 2,

at 28-64; R.*Wbirzir,-supra note 8, at 108-21.
11. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, THE FRONTIERS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 204 (1962).
.12. CORBTr,- CASES- AND OPINIONS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1909). See, e.g.,

The Paquete oHabana, .175 U.S. 677 .-(1900).
13. CORBETT, supra note 12, at.6. .

14. Twelve later-trials were instituted, beginning on-October 26, 1946, to try
the secondary leaders- of the same classes -that-had been tried at the original Niirnberg trial. By a four-power agreement Control Council Law No. 10, providing for
these hearixngs,.-was adopted. Allied Cont.rol Council for Germany Law No. 10,
Dec. 20, 1945, 15 DEP'T STATE BULL: 862 (1946), 13. Mo. L. REv. 72 (1948). For discussions of :this law and the subsequent tribunals, see J. APPLEmAN, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND INTERNATIONAL .CRIMES 139-233 (1954); A. VON KmNIEE, supra note 2,
at 11; R. WOEiTEL, supra note 8, at 219-26; Fratcher, American Organization for
Prosecution of German War Criminals, 13 Mo. L. REV. 45 (1948) (text of law included); Taylor, _Nuremberg Trials: War Crimes and International Law, INT'L
CoNc. No. 450 (1949). The full reports of these trials are collected in I-XIV TLAr.s
OF WAR CRIMINALs-BFaOR THE NuERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL
COUNCIL LAW No. 10 (1946-49).

15. ,Tle Tokyo. International Military Tribunal was. instituted by the Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender (the "Potsdam Declaration");
signed by the Japanese on September 2, 1945.-See 23 DEP'T STATE- BULL. 137 (1952).
The Tribunal was granted "the power to try and punish Far Eastern war criminals. . charged with offenses which-include Grimes Against Peace." INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST CHARTER art. 5. For the Charter and indictment of the Tokyo Tribunal, see U.S. D.EP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 2613, TRIAL OF
J"AANEsE WAR CImINALs 12- (Far East. set. 9 6). See generally J. APPLEmAN, supra
note-14,'at 2. 674; KEENAN 8: BRowN, CRimEs AGAINST INTERNATIONAL LAw 1-56
(1950); R. -WomzL-, supra .note 8, at 227-32; Horwitz, The -Tokyo Trial, INT'L
CONG. No. 465- (1950).
" .
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other locations' 6 adopted and applied the formulation of crimes against
peace contained in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal in
their proceedings. For example, the charter of the Tokyo-tribunal defines
crimes against peace in substantially the same terms as the original Nfirnberg charter.1 7 These subsequent trials have further significance in that
the number of countries participating in them, and thus accepting the
concept of aggressive war as a crime against peace, was considerably expanded beyond the original four Allied Powers who participated at Niirnberg.s
A second source can be found in the provisions relating to the criminal character of aggressive war which were included in several treaties
concluded after the Niirnberg judgment was rendered. -The .Peace Treaty
with Italy, for example, obligates the Italian government to apprehend
and surrender for trial "persons accused of having committed, ordered, or
abetted . .. crimes against peace . . ..."I Peace treaties concluded with

Rumania,2 0 Finland, 2 ' Bulgaria2 - and Hungary2 3 contain similar requirements. These treaties must necessarily rely upon the Nfirnberg charter
for the definition and interpretation of crimes against peace. 24
The constitutions of several countries make up a third source because
they explicitly treat aggressive war as a crime. For instance, the Constitution
of the Federal Republic of Germany provides:
Acts tending and undertaken with the intent to disturb the peaceful relation between nations, especially to prepare for aggressive
war, are unconstitutional. They shall be made a punishable
25
offence.
16. Apart from the proceedings at Niirnberg and Tokyo there were 2,116
known hearings before military commissions or tribunals. For a collection of these
proceedings, see I-XV U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM'N, LAW REPORTS Or TIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS (1947-49). See also J. APPLEMAN, supra note 14, at 267; Cowles, Trials of
WAR CRIMINALS (Non-Nuremberg), 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 299 (1948).
17. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST CHARTER art. 5.

18. The Tokyo Tribunal was composed of members from eleven nations: the
United States, the United Kingdom, China, the Soviet Union, the Netherlands,
Canada, New Zealand, Australia, France, India and the Philippines. R. WOETZEL,
.upra note 8, at 228. In addition to this, hearings were held in Poland, Norway and
Greece. J. APPLEMAN, supra note 14, at 267.
19. Peace Treaty with Italy, Feb. 10, 1947, 61 Stat. 1245, T.I.A.S. No. 1648,
49 U.N.T.S. 3.
20. Peace Treaty with Roumania, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 6, para. (a), 61 Stat. 1757,
T.I.A.S. No. 1649, 42 U.N.T.S. 3.
21. Peace Treaty with Finland, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 6, para. (a), 48 U.N.T.S.
203.
22. Peace Treaty with Bulgaria, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 5, para. (a), 61 Stat. 1915,
T.I.A.S. No. 1650, 41 U.N.T.S. 21.
23. Peace Treaty with Hungary, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 6, para. (a), 61 Stat.
2065, T.I.A.S. No. 1651, 41 U.N.T.S. 135.
24. See Garcia-Mora, supra note 7, at 51.
25. BAsIC LAw oF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY art. 26

(1949, as

amended to 1966). Similar provisions are contained in: CONST. OF THE UNION OF
BURMA § 211 (1947, amended 1959, 1961); CONST. OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC art. 5 (1949, as amended to 1960); CONST. OF THE REpuBLIC OF ITALY art.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol37/iss1/6
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The incorporation of the concept of crimes against peace into the domestic
law of these states is strongly indicative of the degree of its acceptance as
a rule of conduct.
Another source providing valuable proof of international assent, in
terms of sheer numerical strength, is the actions of the United Nations since
the Niirberg trials. On December 11, 1946, the United Nations General
Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution reaffirming the principles of
the Niirnberg judgment and the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal.2 8 To further express its approval of the legal principles of
Niirnberg, the General Assembly, in 1947, requested the International Law
Commission to formulate a "Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind." 27 The resulting Draft Code affirms the criminality
of aggressive war, but it has substantially increased the range of acts which
may incur responsibility for crimes against the peace. Article 1 of the Draft
Code provides generally that "[o]ffences against the peace and security of
mankind as defined in this Code, are crimes under international law, for
which the responsible individuals shall be punishable." 28 Included in the
list of offenses are: acts of aggression, any threat to resort to an act of aggression, and the employment of armed forces against another state.2 9 The
expansion of the Nfirnberg formulation in the Draft Code has led to the
comment that the Code is innovatory rather than declaratory of existing
law.3 0 However, the bases of the Draft Code were clearly taken from Niirnberg and, therefore, it would seem to be persuasive evidence of international
acceptance of aggressive war as an international crime.
A final source is the writings of commentators in the field.31 Although
there is some disagreement, a majority of scholars would seem to consider
the crime against peace of aggressive war to be a rule of customary international law. 32 There are, however, reservations on the part of many writers
arising from the lack of precise definition of the elements and limits of the
33 -

crime.

11 (1947, amended 1953, 1963); CONST. OF JAPAN art. 9 (1946); CONST. OF THE R(1948, as amended to 1962); CONST. OF THE PHILIPPINES art.
2, § 3 (1935, amended 1940, 1946). The texts of these and other constitutions can
PUBLIC OF KOREA art. 4

be found in I-IV A. PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS (rev. 5d ed. 1965).
26. G.A. Res. 95 (i), U.N. Doc. A/236, at 1144 (1946).
27. G.A. Res. 177 (II), U.N. Doc. A/505, at 1280 (1947).
28. Int'l L. Comm'n, Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security
of Mankind art. 1, 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 9, U.N. Doc. A/1858, at 10-14 (1951)
[hereinafter cited as Draft Code].
29. Draft Code, art. 2, paras. 10-11.
80. Garcia-Mora, supra note 7, at 50.
31. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); Hilton v. Guyot, 159

U.S. 115, 168 (1895).
32. See, e.g., S. GLUEcK, supra note 9, at 5. But see Garcia-Mora, supra note
7, at 38.

33 See J.

STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER: A

CRITIQUE OF UNITED NA-

(1958); R. Worz-L, supra note 8, at 170; GarciaMora, supra note 7, at 54; Kelsen, Will the Judgment in the Nuremburg Trial Constitute a Precedent in InternationalLaw?, 1 INT'L L.Q. 153 (1947); Schwarzenberger,
supranote 9, at 344-51.
TIONS THEORIES OF AGGRESSION

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1972
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It would appear from the foregoing evidence of acceptance and usage
by the international community that this crime against peace is an established rule of customary international law. However, doubts still remain as to whether it has been defined with sufficient clarity to be a
truly authoritative rule. The provisions of the "Draft Code of Offences
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind" would seem to dispel many
of these doubts with the caveat that this Code has not as yet been accepted
by the community of nations.
III. THE THEORY

OF INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CRIMEs

AGAINST PEACE

In response to the claims of the German defendants that, as individuals,
they could not be held responsible for the commission of the crime of
aggressive war, the International Military Tribunal said:
[I]nternational law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals
as well as upon states ....

Crimes against international "law are

committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of inter"
national law be enforced. 34
In the past the general practice of international law has been that only
states had rights and duties under that law.3 5 But, ori occasion, the individual has been recognized as responsible for international criminal actions.
For example, pirates have traditionally been regarded as committing a
crime against the law of nations, 36 and it was an accepted principle by
1945 that individual members of belligerent forces are criminally responsible
for violations of the international law of war.37 In these precedents and in
the less well established theory of liability of heads of state for war making,
as exemplified by the proposed trial of Kaiser Wilhelm under the Versailles
Treaty, 88 the International Military Tribunal had some basis for extending the principle of individual responsibility to the crime of aggressive
34. XXII TRIALS OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS
MILITARY TRIBUNAL 465-66 (1948).,
35. W. BIsHoP, INTERNATIONAL LA-W 265 (1962).

BEFORE

TM IN ERNATIONAL

36. See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 161-62- (1820); 2 J.

MooRE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 951 (1906).
37. W. BisHop, supra note 35. at 837-38.

38. Article 227 of the Versailles Treaty provided for the "public arraignment"
of the German Kaiser "for a supreme offense -against international morality and
the sanctity of treaties." This attempt failed when the Kaiser fled to the Netherlands which refused to extradite him. For the Report of:the Commission of the
Versailles Conference, see 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 95 (1920). See also W. BISHOP, supra
note 35, at 838; R. WOmEL, supra note 8, at -31.
Another often cited precedent is the treatment of -Napoleon- Bonaparte who
was declared an outlaw by the Allied Powers and, subsequently, sent -to the island
of St. Helena. This use of this incident as aprecedent for- Niirnberg has met with
- "
much criticism. See, e.g., R. WOETzEL, supra note 8, at 23.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol37/iss1/6
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war. However, as pointed out by one of the subsequent Nilrnberg tribunals
in the "High Command Case," the novelty of such an extension was dear:
For the first time in history individuals are called upon to answer
criminally for certain violations of international law. Individual
criminal responsibility has been known, accepted, and applied
heretofore as to certain offenses against international law, but the
Niirnberg trials have extended that individual responsibility
beyond those specific and somewhat limited fields.39
Although there has been considerable criticism since Niirnberg, 40 this
principle has become inextricably tied to the concept of crimes against
peace, and has been adopted as a central feature of the United Nations'
"Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind." 41
The International Military Tribunal was followed by 12 subsequent
Nirnberg tribunals, each made up of a separate panel of American civilians.4 2 The decisions of these tribunals are not all consistent with those of
the International Military Tribunal. 43 However, three distinct elements
necessary for the conviction of an individual for a crime against peace
have emerged from the judgments of the original and subsequent Nflrnberg tribunals. First, there must be actual knowledge that a specific aggressive war was being planned or waged. This is borne out by the statement
of one of the subsequent tribunals in the "Ministries Case":
Obviously, no man may be condemned for fighting in what he
believes is the defense of his native land, even though his belief
be mistaken..Nor, can one be expected to undertake an independent investigation to determine whether or not the cause for
which he fights is the result*of an aggressive act of his own government. One can be guilty only where kndwledge of aggression in
fact exists, and it is not sufficient that he have suspicions that the
war is aggressive. 44
Secondly, the individual must have taken a part in the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of the aggressive war.45 The degree and character
39. United States v. Von Leeb, XI TRIAL OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 509
(1948) (Case 12-the "High Command Case").
40. Authorities cited note 10 supra.
41- Draft Code, at 4. See Garcia-Mora, supra note 7, at 48.
42. See note 14 supra and authorities cited therein.
48. T. TAYLOR, NUREMiBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AmaRc1AN TRAGEDY 85-86
(1970).
44. United States v. Von Weizaecker, XIV Ti-s
OF WAR CRIMNALs BEFoR
THE NUERNBERG

MILITARY TRIBUNALS

UNDER

CONTROL

COUNCIL LAw

No.

10,

at 387 (1948) (Case 11-the "Ministries Case"). See also J. APPLEiAN, supra note
14, at 225; Lumb, Individual Responsibility for Aggressive War: The Crime
Against Peace, 3 U. QUEENS L.J. 883, 851 (1959).
45. Participation was required for liability under both counts of planning
and waging the war. See XXII TRIAL OF TlE MkjoR WAR CRIINALS BEFOR THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 467-68 (1948).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1972
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of the participation required is in some doubt, since civilians from various
occupations as well as military men were included in those convicted. 46
However, the tribunals seemed to require an affirmative involvement, and
to reject any theory of negative criminality by which a person could be
prosecuted for his failure to prevent the planning and waging of an aggressive war.47 Third, and perhaps most important, it was emphasized that
the individual must have held a sufficiently high position to exert some
influence on planning and policy. 48 The theory underlying individual re-

sponsibility is that in reality it is the individual who acts and not that
abstract entity, the state.40 Therefore, it would seem to follow that only
those who can in fact influence the'actions of the state should be held responsible for its aggressive actions. As it was put in the "High Commands
Case:"
Anybody who is on die policy level and participates in the war
policy is liable to punishment. But those under them cannot be
punished for the crimes of others. The misdeed of the policy makers
is all the greater in as much as they use the great mass of the
soldiers and officers to carry out an international crime; however,
the individual soldier or officer below the policy level is but the
policy maker's instrument ....50
The importance of this and the other elements will become- clearer in the
consideration of the use of the "Niirnberg defense" in the courts of this
country.
Another important aspect of individual responsibility is the rejection
at Niirnberg of the defense of superior orders. Article 8 of the Charter of
the International Military Tribunal states that
[t]he fact that the defendant acted pursuant to order of his government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but
51
may be considered in mitigation of punishment.

46. Defendants Frich, Von Neuroth and Rosenberg, all civilians, were convicted of crimes against peace. For an illustrative table of convictions and sentences,
see W. BisnoF, supra note 35, at 858.
47. This is especially true where the individual lacked actual knowledge of
the aggressive plans of the government and occupied a position below the policy
making level. See United States v. Krupp, IX TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS B.FORE
TrHE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at
1448 (1948) (Case 10-the "Krupp Case").
48. Id. at 457.
49. P. JEssUP, A MODERN LAw OF NATIONS 18 (1948). See XXII TRIAL OF THE
MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 565-66
(1948).
50. United States v. Von Leeb, XII U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM'N, LAW REPORTS
,or TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 69 (1949) (Case 12-the "High Command Case").
51. CHARTER, supra note 3, art. 8; Allied Control Council for Germany Law
No. 10, art. II, § 4 (b), Dec. 20, 1945, 15 DE'T STATE BULL. 862 (1946), 13 Mo. L.
REv. 72 (1948).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol37/iss1/6
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This provision was intended to affect primarily those civilians and members of the military who were attempting to escape liability for the commission of conventional war crimes. However, article 8 was also applied
to defendants accused of crimes against peace who attempted to avoid
52
liability by pleading the overriding orders of Hitler as a defense. It is
the rejection of this defense, which was also subsequently rejected as a
defense in the domestic laws of most states, 3 which gives rise to the claims
of those raising the "Nfirnberg defense" that they are bound by an international and domestic duty to disobey their government.54

IV. THm

"NURNBERG DEFENSE" IN THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES

The defense, as it has been formulated, consists of two separate components. First, the United States Government is committing the crime of
aggressive war. Second, under the principles established at Niirnberg an
individual citizen may be criminally responsible under international law
if he aids his government in the commission of this crime. Therefore, he is
under a duty to disobey the orders of his government which in any way
relate to this crime. 55
It is suggested that a court, in order to properly assess the value of
this defense in any case must ask two parallel questions. Is there in fact a
crime against peace being committed by the government? And second, is
the act which the defendant has refused to perform, resulting in the charge
against him in the domestic court, one which would make him individually
liable under international law for the commission of this crime against
peace? It is within the context of these two questions that the applicability
of the "Niirnberg defense" must be viewed.
A. The Commission of the Crime by the Government
In determining whether a crime against peace is being committed by
the government, a court should first answer a basic question concerning its
competence: Has the customary international crime of aggressive war been
incorporated into the law of the United States? The International Military
Tribunal insisted, without stating its reasons, that international law pre52. See XXII

TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNA-

TIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 466 (1948).

53. Great Britain and the United States were two examples of this change.
R. WomE=z, supra note 8, at 118. For the present United States provision on superior orders, see U.S. DEP'T oF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARARE 1 509
(FM 27-10, 1956).
54. The theory is that since obedience to superior orders is no defense to
charges of crimes against peace, one is under a duty to disobey any orders which
would lead to the commission of such crimes. See Brief for Plaintiff at 10, Farmer
v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Tenn. 1956), afrd per curiam, 252 F.2d
490 (6th Cir. 1958).
55. This defense is most clearly formulated in the Brief for Plaintiff, Farmer
v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Tenn. 1956).
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cedes national law. 56 In Farmerv. United States,57 the first case in which
the "Niirnberg defense" was raised, the defense relied upon the statement
by the International Military Tribunal that "the very essence of the
Charter is that individuals have rights which transcend the national obligations of obedience" 5 8 to justify the proposition that the international
law established at Niirnberg is directly applicable in American courts
without any formal incorporation. 59 While such a proposition may be
acceptable in. those countries whose constitutions contain provisions specifically incorporating international law into the domestic law,6 0 its acceptability is far from settled in the United States. As one writer has put it:
That an act is illegal under international law does .not necessarily
imply that an act is also illegal under national law, especially under
national -criminal law. 6 '
The courts of this country have taken a similarly hesitant attitude toward the question of incorporation. The Constitution, in article I, section 8,
specifically provides that Congress has the power "to define and punish...
Offenses against the Law of Nations.1 62 This power could well be read to
mean that' in the absence of such definition by Congress the international
rule should be regarded as not adopted into the law of the land and
therefore not applicable to an American court.6 3 With regard to international custom in general such a reading has not been given to this
clause. 64 In fact, the courts of the United States would seem to be more in
accord with" the statement of Chief Justice Gray, in The Paquete Habana,6 5
that
56. XXII

TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL

See A. VON KNIERIEm, THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 44
(1959).
57. 149 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Tenn. 1956), affd per curiam, 252 F.2d 490
(6th Cir. 1958).
58. XXII TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAI
MILITAIY TRIBUNAL 466 (1948).
MILITARY TRIBUNAL 466 (1948).

59. See Brief for Plaintiff at 8, Farmer v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 327

(M.D. Tenn. 1956).
60. See CONST. OF FRANCE art. 55 (1958, as amended. to 1963); BAsIC LAW OF
Tim FEDERAL REPUBLIC or GERMANY art. 25 (1949, as amended to 1966); CONST.
OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC art. 5 (1949, as amended to 1960); CONST.
OF THE REPUBLIC OF ITALY art. 10 (1947, amended 1953, 1963); CONST. OF THE
REPUBLIC OF KORE& art. 5 (1948, as amended to 1962); CONST. OF THE PHILIPPINES
art. 2, § 3 (1935, amended 1940, 1946). These provisions gener1y provide that international law is to be treated as the law of the land.
61. Kelsen, supra note 33, at 157.
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See United States v. Arjona, .120 U.S. 479 (1887);

United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820).
63. L. ERAD_,s & W. GOULD, THE RELATION BErwEN INTERNATIONAL LAw AND
MUNICIPAL LAW IN THE NETHERLANDS AND IN THE UNITED STATES 278 (1961). The

authors point out that
there never was any express jurisdiction granted to apply the whole of customary international law both as it was and as it was t6 become. Nor was
that law expressly incorporated as a whole.
64. Ld.
65. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
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[i]nternational law is a part of our law, and must be ascertained
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.66
However, the customary rules of international law adopted by this sort of
judicial incorporation have usually been either customs which were established in the English common law prior to the adoption of the Constitution 67 or well-defined and relatively unquestioned rules of a noncriminal nature.68 The crime of aggressive war fits neither of these categories. Where the customary rule involves individual criminal liability,
there has been a tendency since the early nineteenth century to. look for
some statutory authority emanating from Congress' exercise of its power
to define and punish international offenses. 69 An example of this trend is
the Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte Quirin.7o In Quirin the Court
relied heavily upon congressional incorporation by statute of the laws of
war in upholding the conviction of German saboteurs. 71 This reliance upon
congressional definition by the courts evidences a willingness to read article
I, section 8 as requiring specific incorporation by an act of Congress of international crimes for which there may be individual responsibility, as
opposed to other customary rules. Modifying the rigidity of such an interpretation is Congress' capacity to define by reference to customary international law as was found sufficient in respect to piracy in United States v.
Smith.72 This would permit reference to a customary punishment, but it
would not allow the punishment of such a crime on the grounds of international custom alone.
Despite the absence of incorporation by congressional action it would
appear that the Tribunal's concept of the crimes of aggressive war and
war in yiolation of international agreements has been incorporated by
treaty. The Constitution declares that treaties are a part of the law of
the land.73 The London Agreement of 1945 which contains the formulation

66. Id. at 700.
67. This is predicated upon the so-called "necessary reception" theory. See
Ware v. Hilton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S.
(2 DalI.) 419, 474 (1793); Talbot v. The Commanders & Owners of Three Brigs.
1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 95 (1784). See also W. BISHOP, supra note 35, at 73; L. EFtADES
& W. GOULD, psupra note 63, at 275.
68. See, e.g., Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241 (1808); Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S: (2 Cranch) 187 (1804); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801).
See also L. ERADns & W. GoULD, supra note 63, at 279-89.
69. See United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816); United
States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). These cases arose out of a desire
for statutory definition of crimes generally in the federal courts. L. ERADEs Se W.
GOULD, supra note 63, at 248-49.
70. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
71. Id. at 29.

72. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820).
73. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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of crimes against peace was signed by the United States and has the force
of a treaty.74 Consequently, the crimes as defined in that document have
become a part of the law of the land. However, even where incorporation
by treaty has occurred, some courts have preferred to defer recognition
of novel criminal formulations pending definitive congressional legislation. 7 5
Assuming incorporation, a second problem which may preclude a
court from considering the question of whether the government is committing the crime of aggressive war is the lack of a recognized definition
of the term "aggressive war." One of the major assumptions of the International Military Tribunal was that aggressive war was a well-defined
concept. 76 In accordance with this assumption, the Tribunal failed to include a definition of aggression in its judgment.7 7 As a result, the crime
of aggression remains today "a most vague and general concept not yet
defined nor described by any international instrument."78 Some publicists
in the field of international law have suggested that the absence of definition is beneficial, reasoning that a definition might be subject to arbitrary
interpretation and abuse no matter how carefully it is drafted.7 9 This
fear is basically a recognition of the fact that there is no proper international legal procedure to review alleged acts of aggression.8 0 Taken in this
context, vagueness has some merit. However, when transferred to domestic
courts the absence of a definition raises problems in the consideration of
the "Niirnberg defense."
It has been suggested that the examples of "aggressive wars" cited
by the Tribunal could be used to fashion a practical standard. 8 ' However,
the Tribunal never explained why these conflicts could be described as
aggressive and a court would be faced with questions of historical analysis
such as determining why the International Military Tribunal considered
the conflict between Germany and Norway an aggressive war 8 2 while the
invasion of France was not.8 3 It is apparent that the concept of aggressive
74. WOETZEL, Comments on the Nuremberg Principlesand Conscientious Objection with Special Reference to War Crimes, 16 CATHOLIC L. 257, 258 (1960).
75. See The Over The Top, 5 F.2d 838 (D. Conn. 1925); United States v.
Ekenstam, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 168, 21 C.M.R. 294 (1956). But cf. United States v. Kearney, 2 Extraterr. Cas. 665 (U.S. Ct. for China 1923).
76. Garcia-Mora, Crimes Against Peace in International Law: From Niirnberg to the Present, 53 Ky.L.J. 35, 38 (1964).
77. R. WOETZEL, THE NUREMBERG TRIALs IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 159 (1960);
Garcia-Mora, supra note 76, at 38.
78. Garcia-Mora, supra note 76, at 38. Cf T. TAYLOR, supra note 43, at 98.
79. J. STONE, LEGAL CoNTROLs OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLIcT 330 (1954). Cf.
finch, The Nuremberg Trial and InternationalLaw, 41 Amf. J. IN'L L. 36 (1947);
Sohn, The Definition of Aggression, 45 VA. L. REv. 697 (1959).
80. See J. STONE, supra note 79, at 326.
81. Cf. R. WOETZEL, supra note 77, at 238.

82. XXII

TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL

MILITARY TRIBUNAL 452 (1948).

83. Id. at 429-58. In discussing wars of aggression by Germany, the Tribunal

mentions neither the conflict with France nor that with Great Britain.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol37/iss1/6

12

Patterson: Patterson: Principles of Nurnberg
19721

THE NURNBERG DEFENSE

war has not reached that level of precision and certainty which is required
in criminal law. In the absence of an authoritative definition in international law, satisfactory proof of the commission of this crime against
peace would be impossible in all but the most flagrant cases.
B. For Which Acts May Individual Responsibility Be Imposed?
An essential question for a court faced with the "Niirnberg defense"
is whether the act which the individual is asked to perform is one which
would incur individual responsibility for a crime against peace. An answer
to this question may be found in an examination of the facts of some of
the cases in which the defense has been raised.
In People v. Bloom,84 the court ruled that the "Niirnberg defense"
was irrelevant to a charge of criminal trespass arising out of a "sit-in"
at a local selective service office. Defendants had argued that the United
States was engaged in criminal aggression in Vietnam, and that the principles established at Niirnberg placed upon them a duty to make a "moral
choice" as to whether to disassociate themselves from the government's
action or to suffer the consequences of international liability.8 , Although
this argument was offered primarily to demonstrate the sincerity of the
defendants' protest,86 it exemplifies a common misinterpretation of the
principle of individual responsibility. The defendants in Bloom, as ordinary
citizens, were in no position to have a direct influence on governmental
policy.s 7 The prosecution before the International Military Tribunal expressly limited its indictment to those who had played major roles in
the planning or waging of the war.8 8 A second error in the defendants'
argument in Bloom is that it construed the Niirnberg judgment as espousing a theory of negative criminality, i.e., that the individual citizen would
be liable if he merely failed to protest the actions of his government. In
United States v. Krauch, a later tribunal denied this implication, saying:
Under such a construction the entire manpower of Germany
could, at the uncontrolled discretion of the indicting authorities,
be held to answer for waging wars of aggression.8 9
This tribunal decided that there must be some "practical limitation" upon
criminal responsibility and set that limit at those responsible for the
formulation and execution of national policy. 90
84.
85.
Jan. 28,
86.
87.

Grim. No. 951 (Cir. Ct. Mich., Jan. 28, 1966).
Brief for Defendants at 11, People v. Bloom, Grim. No. 951 (Cir. Ct. Mich.,
1966).
Id. at 12.
See United States v. Von Leeb, XII U.N. WAR CaMES CoM'N, LAW RE-

PORTS OF TriA.s OF WAR CRIMINAlS 69

Case").

88 See R. JACKSON, THE NUREMBERG
89. United States v. Krauch, X U.N.

TRL
us

(1948) (Case 12-the "High Command

33, 36 (1947).
WAR CRmIS COMM'N, LAW PREPORTS OF
OF WAR CrIMINALS 38 (1948) (Case 6-the "Farben Case").
CASE

90. Id.
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In Farmer v. United States, the Government sued to recover assessed
income taxes. The defendant did not rely upon any theory of negative
criminality, but urged that his payment of taxes constituted participation
in the waging of aggressive war.91 While civilians were indicted at Niirnberg for "waging" aggressive war, the payment of federal income taxes
would appear again to fall far short of high level participation in the
waging of the war. In fact, financial or economic aid alone by private
citizens was thought to be an insufficient basis for responsibility by the
tribunal in the Krauch case. 92 For instance, the tribunal excluded such
related individual activities as "the farmer who increased his production
of foodstuffs to sustain the armed forces, or the housewife who conserved
fats for the making of munitions."93
The defendant in United States v. Mitchell 94 claimed that submission
to induction into the armed forces would constitute participation in the
waging of an aggressive war.05 While the court ruled this defense irrelevant
on other grounds, 06 it is certain that the theory of individual responsibility
for aggression does not include the ordinary soldier or officer.9 7 It may
be argued that the soldier may run a much higher risk of liability for
ordinary war crimes than the civilian. However, he does not possess the
position of high responsibility within the armed forces which the tribunals
considered necessary for criminal liability for aggression. In short, he lacks
standing to raise the defense.
It is interesting in considering the acts that may incur responsibility
that the "Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind" differentiates between the liability of a private citizen and the responsibility of the authorities of the state.9 8 In doing so the Draft Code goes
beyond the Niirnberg precedent which is exclusively concerned with the
individual responsibility of those acting for the state. 99 With respect to
the crime of aggression, a private citizen may be liable for conspiracy to
commit aggressive acts or complicity in the commission of aggression by
his government.1 o0 The use of the term "complicity" would seem to en91. Brief for Plaintiff at 8, Farmer v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 327 (M.D.
Tenn. 1956).
92. United States v. Krauch, X U.N. WAR CRIMES ComeNiM, LAW" REORTS OF
TIUALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 38 (1948) (Case 6-the "Farben Case").
93. Id.
94. 246 F. Supp. 874 (D. Conn. 1965), affd, 369 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 972 (1967).
95. Brief for Defendant at 10, United States v. Mitchell, 246 F. ,Supp. 874
(D. Conn. 1965).
.
96. 246 F. Supp. at 899.
97. See United States v. Von Leeb. XII U.N. WAR CRIMES COMm'v, LAwW I PORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALs 69 (1949) (Case 12-the "High'Command
Case").
98. M. GARCIA-MORA, HOSTILE AcTS OF PRIVATE PERSONS AGAINST FOREIGN
STATE 39 (1962).
99. See J. BOwELT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 266 (1958).
100. Draft Code, art. 2, para. 12.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol37/iss1/6
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visage a much broader range of liability than that laid down at Niirnberg.
However, the comments to the Draft Code clearly show that as to individuals, such as the defendants in the three cases examined, criminal liability
would never arise:
In including "complicity" in the commission of any of the offenses
defined in the preceding paragraphs among the acts which are offenses against the peace and security of mankind, it is not intended
to stipulate that all those who contribute, in the normal exercise
of their duties, to the perpetration of offenses against the peace and
security of mankind could, on that ground alone, be considered as
accomplices in such crimes. There can be no question of punishing
as accomplices in such an offense all the members of the armed
forces of the State or the workers in war industries. 10 1
This comment would seem to indicate that although the Draft Code
purports to enlarge the sphere of responsibility for aggressive war, it
actually coincides quite closely with the thinking of the American tribunals
which conducted the subsequent proceedings at Niirnberg. In the absence
of express guidelines it is reasonable to assume that the Code must rely
upon the, criteria of high position and policy-making function in establishing the' lower limits of responsibility. Therefore, it is evident that a
person who seeks immunity from domestic prosecution for acts of civil
disobedience under the principles established at Niirnberg must satisfy
the court' that he occupies an influential policy making position within
the state.
C. Rejection of the Niirnberg Defense by American Courts
In spite of the very real issues raised by incorporation of the principles of Niirnberg into domestic law, at least where the individual occupies
the prerequisite position of influence upon national affairs, the courts
of this country have been quick to eschew any competency to adjudicate
whenever the defense has been raised.
In the Farmercase, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected
possible individual liability for the United States Gov'ernment's commission of the crime of aggression in the Korean conflict as a defense to
a suit to recover assessed federal income taxes. 102 The court 'refused to
consider the defense on the ground that
ftlhe claims set forth in the complaint.., involved political and
governmental questions which are confided by the Constitution to
the legislative and executive branches of the government and over
which the courts have no jurisdiction.10 3
1. Int'l L. Comm'n, Report, 6 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 9, U.N. Doc. A/1858, at
18 (1951).
102. Farmer v. United States, 252 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1958), aff'g per curiam
149'F. Supp. 827 (M.D. Tenn. 1956).
103. 252 F.2d at 491.
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The same approach was followed in United States v. Mitchell, 0 4 Swallow
v. United States,10 5 United States v. Berrigan,1° 6 and United States v. Sisson. 10 However, in Sisson, the court, assuming the defense had been raised
by one who had standing to do so, broadened the penumbra of the political
question doctrine by finding that such questions could not be answered
with regard to the Vietnam conflict because "[a] domestic tribunal is
incapable of eliciting the facts during a war and . . . it is probably in-

capable of exercising a disinterested judgment."' 0 8
This judicial candor, refreshing though it may be, points up the reluctance of the courts to consider questions of executive criminal responsibility arising in the context of a war. The political question doctrine has
consistently been invoked to foreclose judicial re-examination of the foreign
policy decisions of the Executive. 109 The claim of defendants who have
raised the "Niirnberg defense" that an aggressive war was in progress in
Korea or in Vietnam reflects upon the power of the President operating
under his constitutional powers as Commander-in-Chief. Among the presidential powers, the command of the armed forces is the least susceptible
to judicial re-examination, 110 and the courts have rarely made inroads
upon it.'
Even the claim that substantive individual rights guaranteed
by the Constitution have been denied has been largely ineffective against
the Executive."1 2 If the political question approach is followed, as precedent suggests, the individual raising the "Niirnberg defense" will find
himself in an ambiguous position. He may be able to prove that he is
liable under international law if he does not disobey the orders of his
government, but he may be prevented from proving the prerequisite of
that liability, criminal aggression on the part of his government. A clear
and unequivocal incorporation of crimes against peace into the law of the
United States would force a reconsideration of the political question doctrine in this area. If the executive action is in fact criminal, then the
considerations which have prompted judicial restraint in the past, i.e.,
104. 246 F. Supp. 874 (D. Conn. 1965), affd, 369 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 972 (1967).
105. 325 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1963).
106. 283 F. Supp. 336 (D. Md. 1968), afrd, 417 F.2d 1009 (4th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 909 (1970).
107. 294 F. Supp. 515 (D.Mass. 1968).
108. Id. at 518.
109. Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Co., 333 U.S. 103 (1948);
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co.,
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415 (1839); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829). See
Carrington, Political Questions: The Judicial Check on the Executive, 42 VA. L.
Rnv. 175 (1956); Scharpf, JudicialReview and the Political Question: A Functional
Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966).
110. Carrington, supra note 109, at 195.
11. In two similar cases the Supreme Court has held that the President could
not provide for the trial of civilians by military tribunal in areas not within the
theatre of military operations. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946); Ex
parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
112. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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fear of embarrassment of the Executive and lack of political acumen in
the judiciary, " 3 would disappear. Absent a complete reconsideration of
the separation of powers concept, 114 however, a retreat from the political
question doctrine's present position in the area of international military
policy would appear unlikely.
Surprisingly, the standing of the defendant to claim that he may be
liable for the acts of the government in committing crimes against peace
has rarely formed the basis for rejection of the "Niirnberg defense" despite
the fact that none of the defendants in Bloom, Farmer,Mitchell, Swallow,
Berrigan and Sisson occupied a position of sufficient national influence.
While the court in Berrigan held that the defendants lacked standing, the

court's opinion was founded upon the fact that the defendants had not
been called to serve in the armed forces and were not directly involved
in the government's actions in Vietnam.' 1 5 While this reasoning may be
applicable to a defendant who refuses military service because he may
be liable, should he accept service, for the commission of war crimes in
Vietnam,118 it is inappropriate where the defendant raises the possibility
of liability for crimes against peace. However, the Berrigan opinion coupled
with an increasing use of the concept of standing to reject justiciability in
related areas would appear to forecast a greater popularity of that mode
of rejection.117
V. THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE CONFLICT BETWEEN NATIONAL
ORDER AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE

The fundamental issue, as seen by those defendants who have raised
the "Nilrnberg defense," is the relation between the desire for order within
the state and the goal of international peace. The cases discussed above
point to the conflict which results when opposing national and international responsibilities are imposed upon the individual. The defendants
believe that the theory of individual responsibility has created duties which
"transcend the national obligations of obedience," and that acceptance of
the application of this theory to all individuals is necessary to world peace.
It is contended that the international duty provides immunity from the
national duty of obedience where the individual believes that aggression
113. See Carrington, supra note 109, at 187-88.
114. In a related area the Supreme Court has indicated that it would be unwilling to enter into the discussion of foreign policy questions on the basis that
the constitutional separation of powers prevents this consideration by the courts.
Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
115. United States v. Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. 336, 341 (D. Md. 1968).
116. See- D'Amato, War Crimes and Vietnam: The "Nuremberg Defense" and
the Military Service Resister, 57 CAL. L. Ruv. 1055 (1969).
117. See Schwartz &cMcCormack, The Justiciability of Legal Objections to the
American Military Efforts in Vietnam, 46 Tx. L. Rv. 1033 (1968); Velvel, The
War in Vietnam: Unconstitutional,Justiciable, and Jurisdictionally Attachable, 16
KAN. L. REv. 449 (1968).
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is being. committed by his government. 118 On the other hand, the state
may well interpret such a contention as an invitation to anarchy since
it is destructive of the basis for the existence of the state, i.e., the maintenance of internal order.
The defendants' interpretation of the meaning of individual responsibility for criminal aggression and the conflict this theory produces appears
to be improper for three reasons. First, the International Military Tribunal, by applying individual responsibility to only the policy formulators
of the state, did not intend to create a principle of civil disobedience.
As a later tribunal clearly indicated in the "Ministries Case," the individual's obedience to the internal order of the state could not, standing
alone, incur liability for crimes of aggression by the state.' 1 9 There are
two probable reasons for the prosecution of only those who acted for
the state: (1) The policies formulated by these agents became in fact
the acts and policies of the state, and it was the actions of the state which
the International Military Tribunal was created to punish, 2 0 and (2)
those individuals in a position to influence directly the policies of the
state had access to the real facts of the situation out of which the aggressive actions arose. In view of any government's concern with popular
support for its actions, such facts behind those actions as are released to
the ordinary citizen will be cast in the most favorable light. 121 In this
context, it is senseless to propose that the ordinary citizen disobey his
government since he would be unable to come to any accurate decision
as to the legality of his government's policies.' 22 Furthermore, if he does
reach a conclusion he is unable to influence the direction of the objectionable policies. Therefore, when the tribunals spoke of disobedience,
they were referring only to dissent by the policy makers to the proposed
aggressive policies, not disobedience by the populace to those rules that
regulate the internal order of the state.
A second indication that the International Military Tribunal did
not intend to create international duties which conflict with the duties
of the ordinary citizen is the reluctance of that Tribunal to hold responsible the individual who is incapable of making a moral'judgment as to
the nature of the government's policies. In the original judgment the

118. Brief for Defendant at 12, United States v. Mitchell, 246 F. Supp.
(D. Conn. 1965); Brief for Plaintiff at 8, Farmer v. United States, 149 F. Supp.
(M.D. Tenn. 1956); Brief for Defendants at 13, People v. Bloom, Crim, No.
(Cir. Ct. Mich., Jan. 28, 1966).
119. See United States v. Von Weizaecker, XIV TRIALS OF WAR CRI1ANAL
FORE

TuE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS

UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW

874
327
951
BE-

No. 10,

at 435, 463 (1948) (Case 11-the "Ministries Case").
120. Garcia-Mora, supra note 76, at 48.
121. J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 328 (1954). The
author takes a very dim view of the future of individual liability due to the individual's subjection to "nationalized truth as opposed to objective facts.
122. Id. at 329.
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International Military Tribunal said: "The true test.., is not the existence
of the order, but whether moral choice was in fact possible."' 23 This
attitude would appear to be predicated upon a recognition of the fact
that even the heads of state may be rendered incapable of making an
objective judgment by the ties of nationalism and patriotism. Clearly,
the less well-informed citizen would have little if any opportunity to
make an objective judgment. This indicates that the Tribunal took into
account those forces which bind the state together, and was reluctant
to impose responsibility where these forces tended to prevent the making
of moral judgments upon government conduct. Therefore, there is no
basis for insisting that resistance to these forces is a duty under the principles of Niirnberg.
A third criticism of the theory that the principle of individual responsibility should take precedence over the ordinary citizen's duty of national
obedience is that the resultant conflict must be fought out at the individual's expense. If an individual makes a moral judgment concerning
his nation's policies and finds them aggressive, he is faced with the prospect
of obeying international law in order to avoid responsibility for aggres124
sion, and facing possible punishment under national law for disobedience.
This would appear to be an extremely harsh choice, and it is doubtful
that the average individual would choose to obey international law. 25
The threat of punishment under national law is a present one, while
the possibility of punishment under international law is remote. In addition, whereas national law can provide protection to the individual who
chooses to disobey international law, the converse is not true.126 Therefore,
if, as it would appear, the average individual would choose obedience
to national law in preference to international law, the principle that
the international duty takes precedence over national duties is without
force.
It is clear that when the principles of Nilrnberg are properly applied,
they provide no defense to acts of civil disobedience such as those occurring
in the cases in which the defense has been raised to date. It is also evident
that neither the charter nor the judgment of the International Military
Tribunal intended to supplant national obedience in all cases. Rather,
the thrust of Niirnberg is to obtain the obedience of the state to international law by looking through the abstraction of the state and holding
those who in fact direct the actions of the state responsible for those
actions.

123. XXII TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINAs. BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILrTARY TRIBUNAL 466 (1948).
124. A. VON KNIERIEM, THE NUREMBERG TRIALs 45 (1959).
125. J. STONE, supra note 121, at 328; A. VON KNImRmi, supra note 124, at 47.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The claim that the concept of aggressive war with its attendant theory
of individual responsibility has become a customary rule of international
law may be, at present, correct. Moreover, it can be assumed that this
rule has become a part of the law of the United States. However, the
lack of a precise definition for the crime, and the unwillingness of the
courts of this country to undertake unnecessary criticism of the foreign
policy decisions of the Executive prevent its acceptance as a defense to
civil disobedience at present. It remains to be seen, however, whether the
courts will continue to refuse to hear the defense when raised by an individual with standing, i.e., one who formulated or directly influenced the
policies of the government. A consideration of the "Nfirnberg defense"
in such circumstances would go far toward the elimination of the nationstate concept and perhaps foster, by example, the emergence of the Rule
of Law on a supernational level.
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